Investigatory Practices and the Changing Entrapment Defense by Marcus, Paul
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
2000
Investigatory Practices and the Changing
Entrapment Defense
Paul Marcus
William & Mary Law School, pxmarc@wm.edu
Copyright c 2000 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Marcus, Paul, "Investigatory Practices and the Changing Entrapment Defense" (2000). Faculty Publications. Paper 1406.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1406
INVESTIGATORY PRACTICES AND THE 
CHANGING ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE * 
Paul Marcus** 
Introduction 
For decades, serious disagreements were heard concerning the basis for 
the entrapment defense, the two principal tests, and the manner in which the 
tests should be applied. The broad debate regarding entrapment as a way to 
extend judicial control over law enforcement behavior has essentially disap-
peared,t even at the United States Supreme Court.2 Most jurisdictions in our 
country have adopted a view of the defense which looks mainly to the 
culpability of the individual defendant rather than the conduct of govern-
ment officers.3 With this prevailing subjective approach,· judges and juries5 
ask whether the defendant committed the criminal action in response to suf-
ficient inducement by the government, and whether- prior to government 
* (c) 2000 Paul Marcus. 
** Haynes Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. 
1 The debate had been vigorous among Justices of the Supreme Court as well as 
academics and practicing lawyers. See, for instance, the comments of Chief Justice 
Warren and Justice Frankfurter in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958), 
and Justices Rehnquist and Stewart in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 ( 1973). 
2 Justice Brennan was the last holdout arguing for a change in the standard for 
entrapment. He gave up in Mathews v. United States. 485 U.S. 58, 67 (1988) where 
he remarked: 
I join the Court ' s opinion. I write separately only because I have previously joined or 
written four opinions dissenting from this Court's holdings that the defendant's predisposi-
tion is relevant to the entrapment defense. Although some governmental misconduct 
might be sufficiently egregious to violate due process, my differences with the Court have 
been based on statutory interpretation and federal common law, not on the Constitution. 
Were I judging on a clean slate, I would still be inclined to adopt the view that the entrap-
ment defense should focus exclusively on the Government's conduct. But I am not writing 
on a clean slate; the Court has spoken definitively on this point. Therefore I bow to stare 
decisis, and today join the judgment and reasoning of the Court. 
S Most, but not all , jurisdictions use this " subjective approach. " Some large 
states such as California, Texas and Michigan principally review the actions of the 
government agents, under the so-called "objective approach" to entrapment. Min-
nesota, Pennsylvania and New Mexico have adopted tests which combine the two 
approaches. For analysis of the various state views, see, Marcus, The Entrapment 
Def ense (The Michie Co., 2nd Ed. 1995). 
• The federal courts and about two-thirds of the state courts use this test. 
5 Normally the question is one for juries unless a finding can be made as a matter 
of law. See infra note 18. 
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contacr' - that person was "predisposed" toward this sort of criminal ac-
tion.' 
The United States Supreme Court has spoken in depth about the entrap-
ment defense on several occasions settling many of the earlier disputes.8 
Some of the key issues surrounding the defense have not, however, gone 
away. Substantial practical problems remain in applying the defense in the 
context of an enormous number of law enforcement undercover operations 
and "stings,"9 seen in an incredible array of factual settings.lO 
6 The timing of the inquiry had been open to disagreement until the Jacobson de-
cision, infra. It is now beyond dispute that the inquiry is to concentrate on the period 
before the initial approach by the law enforcement agent, as opposed to the time of 
the later solicitation. The difference can be substantial, as in Jacobson. There the de-
fendant was engaged by the government for a period of more than two years before 
any solicitation was made. 
, Deciding whether the defendant was predisposed can be difficult. Most courts 
follow a "totality of circumstances" approach. See, e.g., United States v. McClel-
land, 72 F .3d 717, 722 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 1 16 S. Ct. 1448 (1996): 
Predisposition is established only after analyzing five factors: I) the character and rep-
utation of the defendant; 2) whether the government made the initial suggestion of crimi-
nal activity; 3) whether the defendant engaged in the activity for profit; 4) whether the de-
fendant showed any reluctance; and 5) the nature of the government's inducement. 
S Disputes, for instance, as to whether the government's sale/purchase back of an 
illegal substance is necessarily entrapment-Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 
484 (1976)-and whether inconsistent defenses must be barred in the entrapment 
setting- Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988). The answer to both ques-
tions is " no. " 
9 In just the last several years, long term undercover investigations have been cre-
ated with these catchy names: 
- Operation Casablanca 
- Operation Lost Trust 
- Wonderland Club Sting 
- Operation Clean 
- Operation Seek and Keep 
- Project Exile 
- Operation Tree Surgeon 
- Crown Casting Company Operation 
- Operation Ramp Rat 
- Operation Bright and Shiny 
- False Flag Operation 
- Operation Double Barrel 
- Operation Norlock 
- The Dirty Three Operation 
Media coverage of these investigations is on file with the author. 
10 Over these past same years, undercover operations have been designed to 
combat, among many others, these crimes: 
- alien smuggling 
- blackmail 
- theft of computer chips, golf clubs, sports rings, wiring 
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Much has been written regarding the rationale for the entrapment defense 
and the policies behind the various approaches.11 This essay is not the venue 
for a reconsideration of such matters. Nor am I interested now in encourag-
ing a very different view of the defense, particularly in light of the Chief 
Justice's frequent reminder that entrapment is "a relatively limited 
- dog fighting 
- indecent exposure 
- extortion 
- fraud in a host of areas such as tax, food stamp, insurance, securities, telemarket-
ing, police crime labs, voter registration, and government contracts 
- illegal militia activi ties 
- sale of illegal meat 
- garbage hauling cartels 
- unlawful dispensing of drugs 
- robbery 
- assault 
- battery 
- political corruption 
- unlawful wildlife purchases 
- bombing 
- assassination 
- sale of illegal weapons 
- money laundering 
- child pornography, child molestation 
- drug trafficking 
- murder 
- outstanding felony warrants 
- prostitution 
- price fixing (for bread, chemicals, com syrup) 
- graffiti 
- bribery 
- rape 
- medical insurance kickbacks. 
The subjects of these stings have been a rich assortment of citizenry including 
judges, doctors, lawyers, F.B.I. agents, business leaders, pharmacists, police offic-
ers, teachers, school principals, chemists, athletes, clergy, movie stars, elected of-
ficials, and bakers. Here, too, media coverage of these investigations is on file with 
the author. 
11 See, e.g., Lord, " Entrapment and Due Process: Moving Toward a Dual System 
of Defenses," 25 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 463 , 517 (1998); Marcus, " Presenting, Back 
From the [Almost] Dead, The Entrapment Defense," 47 Fla. L. Rev. 205 (1995); 
Camp, " Out of the Quagmire After Jacobson v. United States : Towards a More Bal-
anced Entrapment Standard," 83 J. Crim. L. & Criminology lOSS, 1096-97 (1993); 
Bennett, "From Sorrells to Jacobson : Reflections on Six Decades of Entrapment 
Law, and Related Defenses, in Federal Court," 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 829 (1992); 
Carlson, "The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment Defense," 
73 Va. L. Rev. 10 II (1987); Groot, " The Serpent Beguiled Me and I (Without 
Scienter) Did Eat-Denial of Crime and Entrapment Defense," 1973 U. III. L. Rev. 
254 (1973); Park, "The Entrapment Controversy, " 60 Minn. L. Rev. 163 (1976). 
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defense.' , 12 But, in viewing the manner in which the defense is raised 
throughout our country, I am struck by the presence of genuine change in 
one important area. This change is certainly worthy of note. 
The Evolving Process 
The most recent entrapment opinion from the Supreme Court provides a 
strong impetus for the development taking place. In Jacobson v. United 
States,13 the Court was faced with an egregious sting operation in which 
undercover postal investigators targeted an individual with no prior record. 14 
They conducted a lengthy campaign of personal contacts with him,15 and the 
agents emphasized to him- in this child pornography case-the importance 
of supporting strong freedom of speech considerations under the First 
Amendment. 18 The defendant raised an entrapment defense, but was 
convicted of receiving obscene materials through the mail, materials sent to 
him by the postal inspectors soon after they asked him to order the items!7 
The Court, in reversing the conviction, went well beyond expressing dis-
pleasure with the somewhat unusual law enforcement initiative. Instead, the 
Court found entrapment as a matter of lawl8 and spoke strongly of the 
government's behavior. 
Had the agents in this case simply offered petitioner the opportunity to 
order child pornography through the mails, and petitioner- who must be 
presumed to know the law- had promptly availed himself of this criminal 
opportunity, it is unlikely that his entrapment defense would have war-
ranted a jury instruction. 
But that is not what happened here. By the time petitioner finally 
placed his order, he had already been the target of 26 months of repeated 
mailings and communications from Government agents and fictitious 
organizations .... . 
Law enforcement officials go too far when they "implant in the mind of 
an innocent per on the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce 
its commission in order that they may prosecute."ID 
Sorting out the meaning of the decision has not been easy for judges and 
lawyers. But change, important change, based on that decision is surely oc-
curring. Perhaps the leading judicial assertion of a broad reading of Jacob-
12 United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 , 435 (1973). 
13 503 U.S. 540 (1992). 
14 The agents had been alerted to him as a result of a raid of a bookstore which 
sold sexually explicit magazines (but not then deemed obscene). Id. at 543. 
15 rd. at 543-47. 
18 Id. at 544-45. 
17 18 U.S.c. § 2252(a)(2)(A) [a section of the Child Protection Act of 1984]. 
18 A claim of entrapment as a matter of law requires the defendant to show that 
"there is undisputed testimony which shows conclusively and unmistakably that an 
otherwise innocent person was induced to commit the act." United States v. Duran, 
133 F.3d 1324, 1335 (10th Cir. 1998). 
19 503 U.S. at 550, 553. 
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son is Judge Posner's opinion for the en bane Seventh Circuit in United 
States v. Hollingsworth. 20 There, in a case involving two arnateurs21 caught 
up in a government sponsored money laundering scheme, the majority held 
that the proper question regarding predisposition is not simply whether the 
defendants were eager and quick in response to the government induce-
ment.22 Rather, the courts should determine if the defendants would have 
committed the crime without the government involvement. This determina-
tion emphasizes much more substantially a causal link between the 
defendant's state of mind, the government inducement, and the ultimate 
cnme. 
[T]he Court [in J acobson] clarified the meaning of pred isposition. 
Predisposition is not a purely mental state, the state of being willing to 
swallow the government's bait. It has positiona l as well as dispositional 
force. The dictionary definitions of the word include "tendency" as well as 
" inclination. " The defendant must be so situated by reason of previous 
training or ex perience or occupation or acquaintances that it is likely that 
if the government had not induced him to commit the crime some crimi-
nal would have done so; o nly then does a sting or other arranged crime 
take a dangerous person o ut of circulation.23 
I have written before, in praise of Hollingsworth,24 arguing that it cor-
rectly applied Jacobson , and urging other courts to follow the lead of the 
Seventh Circuit. 25 Not taking into account the likelihood of the crime without 
government involvement is both a distortion of the entrapment defense and a 
disservice to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system. After all, 
if the defendant never would have committed the crime without government 
20 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994) [en banc). 
21 One a dentist, the other a farmer. "Tyros," in the court's parlance. Id. at 1203. 
22 Often courts equate predisposition with enthusiasm, or even a lack of hesita-
tion . See, e.g., United States v. Dozal-Bencomo, 952 F.2d 1246, 1251 ( lOth Cir. 
1991), (indicating that predisposition may be inferred from defendant's' 'eagerness 
to participate in the transaction, his ready response to the government's inducement 
offer .. . "). Of course, in Jacobson, the defendant did not hesitate in response to 
the ultimate solicitation. Still, the Court found entrapment as a matter of law, as the 
solicitation occurred more than two years after the first contact with him. 
23 27 F.3d at 1200. 
24 See Marcus, supra, note II . 
25 
Wi th long-term investigations, intensive operations, or tremendous incentives to com-
mit crime being offered, government investigators ought to be able to point to more than a 
willingness, or even an eagerness, on the part of the defendant to participate in the crime. 
Instead, the prosecution must show that even wi thout the government involvement the 
person would have been likely to commit a crime in the foreseeable future. This result 
strikes the proper balance between careful investigation by the government, and the cre-
ation of unlawful behavior. 
Td., 47 Fla. L. Rev. at 245. 
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inducement, why is this person being prosecuted, why are valuable public 
resources being utilized?26 
Few judges have chosen to rely on the "positional" approach of Holl-
ingsworth.27 Still, even in those courts which have not embraced this ratio-
nale, movement toward a much stronger use of the entrapment defense can 
be seen. The Ninth Circuit experience is illustrative. In its first major deci-
sion after Jacobson, the court could not find that the view of the Seventh 
Circuit was consistent with the Supreme Court's entrapment jurisprudence. 
Relying on Hollingsworth , Thickstun interprets J acobson to hold that a 
defendant not only must intend to break the law but must be "ready" to 
do so prior to government contact. If she desires to commit a crime but 
lacks the means to accomplish it, and a government agent subsequently 
supplies those means, under T hickstun 's reading of Jacobson, she was 
entrapped. 
We read Jacobson not as creating a requirement of positional readiness 
but as applying settled entrapment law. The inference that the 
government's methods had persuaded an otherwise law-abiding citizen to 
break the law, coupled with the absence of evidence of predisposition , 
established entrapment as a matter of law under the existing two-part 
test. It was not necessary for the court to expand the entrapment defense, 
nor is there language in the opinion indicating that it did 50 .28 
Fair enough, the court could not find that Jacobson had expressly changed 
the subjective test. Hence, the court was unwilling to direct trial judges to 
look to the' 'positional" approach. 
The entrapment jurisprudence in the Ninth Circuit though, does not end 
there. Less than one year later, the judges were again faced with a difficult 
undercover investigation, in United States v. Martinez .29 While the court 
would not explicitly follow the Seventh Circuit lead, it reversed the narcot-
ics conviction and found entrapment as a matter of law. It reached this 
conclusion by scrutinizing very closely the activities of the government in 
soliciting the crime, and also the evidence relating to the defendant's prior 
intent to commit the offense. As to the former; the record showed that a 
mutual friend had introduced the defendant to a paid police informant and 
the informant had a series of contacts with the defendant for more than two 
months, effectively "wooing" the defendant.80 According to the court, the 
informant made a fine living from his activities: $500 per week to uncover 
26 Questions well asked- and answered-in Hollingsworth . 27 F.3d at 1202. 
27 A Fifth Circuit panel did in United States v. Knox, 112 F.3d 802,808 (5th CiI. 
1997) and it was reversed en bane, United States v. Brace, 145 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 
1998) [en bane]. In Brace, the majority of the circuit found that the "positional 
readiness" view of the panel had not been properly raised by the parties in the ap-
peal and thus the court would " not address issues not presented to us." Id. at 260-
61 . The court did write that "the law of our circuit is at least arguably contra" to the 
holding in Hollingsworth. Id. at 260. 
26 United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997). 
29 122 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 1997). 
30 rd. at 1164. 
243 
CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN 
drug dealers, plus $3000-$4000 per arrest.3l Regarding the latter concern, 
the prosecution offered little to support the view that the defendant was 
predisposed to commit the drug offense.32 
The dissenter in Martinez complained that the majority was placing too 
much emphasis on the actions of the informant: " [I]t is not the degree of 
government participation that is critical but, rather, the predisposition of the 
defendant." 33 For him, the agent's " inappropriate conduct [was] beside the 
point."34 He had a point. To be sure, the federal courts utilize the subjective 
view of the entrapment defense, not the objective view; as such- at least 
traditionally- they are supposed to review mainly the defendant's state of 
mind, not the government's conduct. The majority, though eschewing the 
Seventh Circuit approach, emphasized heavily the nature of the inducement 
and, quoting an earlier Supreme Court opinion,35 decided that the solicitation 
was inappropriate and that the defendant had been entrapped. "[The 
informant] played on the weaknesses of an innocent party and beguiled him 
into committing crimes which he otherwise would not have attempted.' '36 
Moreover, while the decision did not even cite Judge Posner's broad 
reading of the Court's opinion, it quoted Jacobson and reiterated that the 
causal link was essential to the government's case in resisting the entrap-
ment defense. "[The informant 's inducement] led to the apprehension of an 
otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would 
have never run afoul of the law. ' '37 
I believe the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have applied the Supreme Court 
entrapment precedent just right. Whether one labels it a causal link determi-
nation (Ninth Circuit), or a positional approach (Seventh Circuit), the results 
in both of these cases are correct, and wholly consistent with Jacobson.38 By 
weighing heavily the activities of the government agent, as well as looking 
31 Tax free ... . Id. at 1163. 
32 The government offered no evidence to rebut the defendant's testimony of his 
reluctance. ld. at 1164. 
331d.atI167. 
S4 Id. 
3G Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958). 
38 122 F.3d at 1166. 
37 Id. 
38 These two circuits have not been the only courts to shift direction in light of 
Jacobson . The court in United States v. Gamache, 156 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998)-
albeit in a case involving the trial judge's refusal to instruct on entrapment- weighed 
heavily the nature of the government action. 
Gamache initially expressed only his desire for a sexual relationship with Frances and 
his intent to form a non-sexual relationship with her children. [n addition, the agent here 
manufactured the aura of a personal relationship between Gamache and the fictional 
"Frances," and "Frances" disclosed her fictional illicit intentions only well into the cor-
respondence. These solicitations are quite similar to the type of "psychologically 
graduated" responses that the Jacobson Court found objectionable. Second, the govern-
ment agent provided justifications for the illicit activity (intergenerational sex) by describ-
ing "herself' as glad that Gamache was " liberal" like her, expres ing that she, as the 
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to the evidence of prior criminal behavior by the accused, a court can 
properly determine if this person likely would have committed this crime 
without the government involvement.3D If we are left with some doubt as to 
such probable behavior, entrapment as a matter of law should be found.40 
With this approach to undercover investigations and the defendant's af-
firmative defense in the criminal trial, judges are able to balance the needs of 
the government to investigate crimes with the individual's right not to be 
persuaded to take actions which she otherwise would not have taken.41 After 
all, agents could still engage in serious undercover operations. Of course, the 
suggested approach of looking closely to the probability of the defendant 
acting on her own without government inducement would encourage trial 
judges more often to find the defense as a matter oflaw. The result, however, 
is to restore the entrapment defense to an appropriate position in such 
prosecutions. The government will undoubtedly continue to conduct wide 
mother of the children, strongly approved of the illegal activity, and explaining that she 
had engaged in this conduct as a child and found it beneficial to her. These solicitations 
suggested that Gamache ought to be allowed to engage in the illicit activity, just as the 
Government in Jacobson used a fake lobbying organization to appeal to anti-censorship 
motives. Finally, the Government's sting commenced in May 1995 and did not result in 
any illegal conduct until January 1996. Thus, the Government persevered for almost seven 
months to elicit the offense conduct. 
[d. at It. In addition, the prosecution had argued that an "enthusiastic response" 
was sufficient to defeat the entrapment claim. Citing Hollingsworth , the court wrote 
that such a response "although clearly relevant to the jury's inquiry, is not sufficient 
by itself to mandate a finding that he was predisposed." Id. at 12. 
39 The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Martinez well makes the point. By reviewing 
with care the government's actions, the evidence as to pre-disposition becomes 
clearer. 
Plancarte spent more than two months wooing Martinez. According to Martinez's un-
contradicted testimony, Plancarte cajoled, scolded, and pressured Martinez throughout 
this time. Among other tactics, Plancarte reassured Martinez not to worry about the police, 
attempted to teach Martinez about the drug trade, scolded Martinez because he didn't 
know how to sell drugs, and was "always instructing" him about the drug trade. Eventu-
ally, Plancarte attempted to sway Martinez with promises of wealth and friendship. Mar-
tinez finally gave in shortly after Plancarte promised to become his' 'padrino." Thus, the 
undisputed evidence shows that Plancarte went to great lengths to lure Martinez with pres-
sure tactics, suggestions and promises of companionship, wealth, friendship, and an 
important symbolic relationship. 
In addition, there was strong circumstantial support for the inference that Plancarte was 
inappropriately aggressive in inducing Martinez. 
122 F.3d at 1164-65. 
40 If there is a reasonable doubt as to predisposition, the defendant must prevail. 
See Gamache, supra, 156 F.3d at 9; United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1504 
(8th Cir. 1996). 
41 As stated by Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Sherman, supra, 356 U.S. at 
383: "No matter what the defendant's past record and present inclinations to 
criminality, or the depths to which he has sunk in the estimation of society, certain 
police conduct to ensnare him into further crime is not to be tolerated by an advanced 
society. " 
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ranging investigations, a judicially approved practice.42 What the proposed 
approach will not permit routinely are dubious practices such as engaging in 
tremendously long term investigations,4s giving great sums of money to 
engage in relatively minor criminal acts,.4 or creating specially tailored 
incentives based upon particular interests of the defendant such as appearing 
in the movies or even receiving free vacations.45 
An Alternative? 
Reliance on the entrapment defense46 is not the only way the criminal 
justice system could respond to concerns as to questionable investigations.47 
One could find that undue government actions are invalid under the Due Pro-
cess Clause. Such an approach, alas, is highly problematic. 
In theory, the due process analysis seems ideal, for it is considered apart 
from the entrapment defense.48 Moreover, the courts as a matter of constitu-
tional construction could limit over-involvement oflaw enforcement in crim-
inal activity. Also, the doctrine has a powerful heritage looking to the search-
and-seizure opinion of Justice Frankfurter in the famous stomach pumping 
case, Rochin v. California.49 In the entrapment setting, however, the doctrine 
has not fared nearly as well. 
42 This oft-repeated statement was made by then-Justice Rehnquist in United 
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973): 
The illicit manufacture of drugs is not a sporadic, isolated criminal incident, but a 
continuing, though illegal, business enterprise. In order to obtain convictions for illegally 
manufacturing drugs, the gathering of evidence of past unlawful conduct frequently proves 
to be an all but impossible task. Thus in drug-related offenses law enforcement personnel 
have turned to one of the only practicable means of detection: the infiltration of drug rings 
and a limited participation in their unlawful present practices. Such infiltration is a 
recognized and permissible means of investigation. . . . 
43 Almost two and one-half years in Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550. 
44 As in Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1200-1201. 
45 Actual enticements in some of the prosecuted, but unreported cases. See supra 
notes 9 and 10. 
46 A limited reliance, as the Chief Justice has stated succinctly: " But the defense 
of entrapment .. . was not intended to give the federal judiciary a 'chancellor's 
foot' veto over law enforcement practices of which it did not approve." Russell, 
supra, 411 U.S. at 435. 
47 In a case in which a young now-Vice President AI Gore was involved as a 
reporter, the defense counsel in closing argument referred to the sting operation 
there as " the meanest, vilest, sneakiest method of law enforcement." The jury 
found the defendant not guilty. Maraniss, " As a Reporter, Gore Found A Reason to 
be in Politics," Washington Post A-I, January 4, 1998. 
48 One can be predisposed and continue to raise the constitutional claim. See 
Commonwealth v. Monteagudo, 693 N.E.2d 1381 (Mass. 1998). 
49 342 U.S. 165 (1952). The Court there reversed a conviction after the police had 
directed a medical pumping of the defendant ' s stomach in order to obtain incrimi-
nating evidence (the defendant had swallowed pills). 
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The due process approach in the area was first mentioned, in dictum, by 
then-Justice Rehnquist in 1973 when he commented that the Court "may 
some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforce-
ment agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely 
bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a 
conviction."60 From that promising beginning, however, the doctrine has 
seen much resistance and limited application. Few federal courts have actu-
ally struck down convictions on this basis .51 Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
himself retreated from the notion that due process could even form the 
basis-apart from the entrapment doctrine-for voiding a conviction, 52 and 
some judges today question whether the due process claims still exists. 53 
Most courts do recognize the doctrine,54 but at the same time find it to be 
very limited in application.M Judges have not been sufficiently outraged, for 
the purpose of utilizing either the entrapment or the due process analysis, 
even when faced with quite extreme behavior. Courts have refused to act in 
egregious cases ranging from sexual contact by government agents,56 to the 
purchase/sale of illegal drug or drug components, 57 or even to the involve-
ment of police in the production of bombs.68 Looking in this area to the Due 
Process Clause for protection against overzealous law enforcement behavior 
is likely to leave one disappointed.59 
50 United States v. Russell , 411 U.S. 423, 431 (1973). 
51 State judges have been more inclined to apply the doctrine in favor of the 
defense. See Marcus, supra note 3, at § 7.05 . 
52 Along with two other Justices, in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 
(1976). 
53 The leading critic of the doctrine is probably Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh 
Circuit. See his forceful concurring opinion in United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 
1265, 1271 - 73 (7th Cir. 1989), and the author's response in Marcus, "The Due Pro-
cess Defense in Entrapment Cases: The Journey Back," 27 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 457, 
465- 66 (1990). 
64 See, e.g., United States v. Gell-lren, 146 F .3d 827, 831 (lOth Cir. 1998); United 
States v. Franco, 136 F.3d 622, 629 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Carter, 966 F. 
Supp. 336, 343 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
65 The standard is whether the law enforcement action is "shocking, outrageous, 
and clearly intolerable." United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221 , 231 (3rd 
Cir. 1998). The defense "is available only where the government ' is so involved in 
the criminal endeavor that it shocks our sense of justice.'" Franco, supra, 136 F.3d 
at 629, or when the government engages in " the use of extreme, conscience-
shocking physical or psychological coercion .... [A]nd time has shown that the 
judicial conscience is sturdy." Labensky v. County of Nassau, 6 F. Supp. 2d 161 , 
171,173 (B.D.N.Y. 1998). 
58 Nolan-Cooper, supra; Gamache, supra. 
57 Hampton , supra; United States v. Sanchez, 138 F.3d 1410 (lith Cir. 1998). 
58 United States v. Nunez, 146 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 1998). 
59 See generally, Lord, supra note II, 25 Fla. St. U. Rev. at 504-13. This due pro-
cess approach, of course, is not the only alternative. Some have suggested various 
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Conclusion 
Balancing the need to engage in undercover operations against interests 
of individual liberty will always be difficult. After Jacobson courts are justifi-
ably promoting a more careful review of both government inducement and 
lack of evidence of predisposition so as to determine if the defendant would 
have committed the criminal act without law enforcement encouragement. 
Surely, this must be the lesson from Jacobson itself. There, the Eighth Circuit 
en banc discussed at length the contention that Due Process had been violated 
by the postal inspectors' operation, but spent little time looking to the danger 
actually posed by this offender.GO The Supreme Court, however, did not men-
tion Due Process and instead found entrapment as a matter of law after 
chastising the postal service investigators for their intense involvement with 
the defendant.61 
We are, then, left with the advice of the United States Supreme Court to 
avoid the constitutional ground and to advance more intense judicial scrutiny 
of the government in the entrapment context. Such an evidentiary approach 
will have a positive impact by concentrating attention on both the role of the 
government in investigating crime, and the relationship of law enforcement 
activity to the ultimate commission of crime. In increasing numbers, judges 
are following this advice by asking whether, without government involve-
ment, the defendant likely would have committed the charged crime. 
Certainly, for all concerned, that is the appropriate question to ask and 
answer. 
forms of judicial consideration of individualized suspicion before government 
undercover operations could commence. The courts have been singularly unenthusi-
astic about such a course. But see, Siobogin, " Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: 
Investigative Lies By the Police," 76 Oregon L. Rev. 775, 805- 808 (1997); Mos-
teller, "Moderating Investigative Lies By Di sclosure and Documentation," 76 
Oregon L. Rev. 833, 839 (1997). 
60 916 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990), overruled, 503 U.S. 540 (1992). 
61 See discussion in text accompanying notes 13- 19, supra. 
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